### FW

Aff teaches most portable skills for real world activism and decisionmaking – gov expertism and secrecy means we can’t know what we’re up against so we should role-play as ourselves in a state of epistemological incompetence because not everyone who leaves this space will be politicians.

Mansfield, ‘6 [Nick Mansfield; As the Dean Higher Degree Research at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, he is the senior academic responsible for postgraduate research study across all Faculties and departments. After completing his PhD in English Literature from the University of Sydney, Nick was a Harkness Fellow at Columbia University in New York, and subsequently at Yale University. After returning to Australia, he taught at Flinders University in Adelaide, and then at Macquarie, first in English and then in Critical and Cultural Studies. Nick is one of the founding general editors of the journal Derrida Today “Refusing Defeatism: Derrida, Decision and Absolute Risk”; SOCIAL SEMIOTICS VOLUME 16 NUMBER 3 (SEPTEMBER 2006); Accessed 3/12/14]

What is at stake here is the politics of decision and the insistence on responsibility. Someone is making decisions, but because of the undefined nature of their position in a complex that cannot picture, understand or map itself, they cannot know their role, the power of their decision or perhaps even that the small technical choices they are making are world-historical. The shifting nature of the relations between knowledge, power, death-dealing and the on/off logic of technical progress rob decision of ground and moment. No-one really knows or can know what they are doing. It is this hiddenness [sic] and incommensurability, this over-determined, under-self-conscious space that needs to be spoken. ‘‘Decision itself, and choice’’, Derrida writes, ‘‘are being subtracted from us, are abandoning us’’ (1984, 22). The function of speech here then, the meaning of speech, is to allow events to separate and become themselves. This can only happen if decision is fore-grounded as an act in which the issue of competence is at stake, in which those to whom competence is a problem insist that this realisation be included in the texture of every and all decisions. In other words, the automatism of calculated and pre-fixed options has to be exposed for what it is: the will to rob decision of its subjectivity and thus its indeterminacy, to pretend that decisions already long made were not in fact decisions, but the implementation of a necessary programming. Speech then must raise for the competent the slow, hard, gruelling problem of competence. It must remind the competent that it is in in-competence that we may better know the way. In the state of emergency, the terror of the event makes a competence knowable as such purely hypothetical. There can only be in-competence in its two denominations: self-conscious or disingenuous. Only in-competence can decide, and indeed act. What is at stake is whether or not it admits to what it is. (It is this insistence on the logic of in-competence in Derrida that separates this logic of decision from the Schmittian mystification of the decision as the exercise of a sovereignty that substitutes the privilege of exceptionality for the democracy of responsibility. Schmittian decisionism is a relative of calculation because it insists on the invulnerability of the decision to accountability.) The in-competent are not simply just intellectuals then. They are [sic] everyone not in a position of technical, military or political pseudo-competency. In the age of elite techno-military-economic fundamentalism, the broad population, to which the intellectual here is in a metonymic relation, is excluded from the executive knowledge and capability that democracy says it adjudicates and licences. The problem of in-competence that the intellectual curates is socially central because in an age of over-competence, where the prerogative to act is locked up among the super-qualified and their esoteric languages, citizens must know how to evaluate not from a position of information, but from one of ignorance; not from being fully informed, but from being confused, mystified and forgotten. Democracy depends, then, not on the fully-informed citizen, but the unintimidated evaluation carried out by the in-competent and uncertain, those for whom competence endures as a problem. And we must be explicit about this. Our in-competence is being prostituted so that its inflammatory nature can be neutralised. At the moment, in-competence is sucked into the generalised defeatism of the age as automatic, populist scepticism towards judges, academics, politicians, talking heads of every kind homogenised in one sweeping tide of pre-emptive condemnation, the automatic and defensive knee-jerk reaction against the tyranny of competence. This in-competence has to be retrieved as an actively considering responsibility, not panicky defeatist intolerance.

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debate mimics the roles and goals of war-mongers instead of revolutionizing creative solutions – our process is a prerequisite to any deliberative politics.

Mansfield, ‘6 [Nick Mansfield; As the Dean Higher Degree Research at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, he is the senior academic responsible for postgraduate research study across all Faculties and departments. After completing his PhD in English Literature from the University of Sydney, Nick was a Harkness Fellow at Columbia University in New York, and subsequently at Yale University. After returning to Australia, he taught at Flinders University in Adelaide, and then at Macquarie, first in English and then in Critical and Cultural Studies. Nick is one of the founding general editors of the journal Derrida Today “Refusing Defeatism: Derrida, Decision and Absolute Risk”; SOCIAL SEMIOTICS VOLUME 16 NUMBER 3 (SEPTEMBER 2006); Accessed 3/12/14]

In Virilio’s domain of ‘‘pure war’’, the inspired antagony of unresolved controversy in politics has become subordinate to ‘‘logistics’’. In logistics, society ceases to be the site of a politics of deliberation and justice, and becomes merely a resource-field for a techno-military apparatus. The warmachine, then, is not the instrumental frontier nor the delegated forward post of society, but the ultimate purpose of society’s intensifying self-rationalisation. Increasingly, economics and social policy mimic [sic] the ruthless teleologism of the military, to the point where, incredibly, the military becomes no longer the cruellest denomination of means and ends thinking, and the patient and frustrating logic of exploratory articulation is seen as effete and embarrassing, and endures only in its evil twin, the ecstatic and vindictive explosion of tribalistic calumny. Judgement supersedes discussion, and loses any connection with justice. This pseudo-thinking translates decision into calculation, and responsibility into a kind of de-subjectivised automatism. It is the progress of humanity without human beings, and reached a height in the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction during the Cold War. Logistics then is the science of antidecision, where systems reduce considered and multiplying alternatives to predicted and pre-loaded options. The defining context for both Derrida in the article we are reading and for Virilio, of course, was this Cold War, where logistics insisted on ever-narrowing fissures in time in which calculations could be made. Decision becomes here simply the enactment of a narrow range of choices with direct and knowable causes and consequences. Logistics’ dream is the smallest possible window on the smallest possible view. It can thus pre-load the future, and reduce the role of that historical adjunct and accident, the un-economic virus of human consideration. Virilio famously argued that the reduction of duration robbed politics of the oxygen it needs. ‘‘Democracy, consultation, the basis of politics, requires time’’ (Virilio and Lotringer 1983, 28). This time must be defined by its resistance to competence, its insistence, even under the pragmatic pressure of violence and immediacy, on the irreducibility and even the historical necessity of difficulty. There is little reason for us to believe that the de-democratising society into which we are being straight-jacketed by the war of terror is discontinuous with the logistical society of the Cold War. In fact, the reduction of decision to degree zero remains the goal of the globalising impulse, and the war of terror that is its progeny. Globalisation and Mutually Assured Destruction have much in common in that they are both about constructing intellectual systems that reduce the role of human consideration to zero. It is this that speech in Derrida aims to complicate. The very substructure of decision-making needs not to be invented, but revealed. The idea of the degree zero of decisions is of course a fantasy. Decisions are being made, people are ‘‘giving orders where no model . . . can help them at all’’ (Derrida 1984, 22). But this is not admitted. Decisions must be avowed, which means that they must become obviously reflexive; and they must also be socialised, in that they must be known and shared. Logistics then is the degree zero of reflection, the mind of history as universal machine. It is the apotheosis of competence because it excludes the uncertainty or hesitation that separates in-competence from automatic doing, and that makes it the sacred guarantee of anything that could pass for democracy. Decision, then, is in-competence as responsibility. But what exactly is decision, and what is it to take responsibility? Here we turn to the second reading, a brief extract from the interview with Derrida conducted by Deborah Esch and Tom Keenan in 1987, and published for the first time in Negotiations in 2002. Derrida is trying to explain what he means by negotiation: The negotiation I am discussing is not simply a calculation. One calculates as much as possible, but there must also be a nonintegratable, incalculable part. The decision to cut or not to cut the Gordian knot is never certain. If one were sure of the calculation, it would not be an action or a decision; it would be a programming. (Derrida 2002, 31) Negotiation separates itself from certainty and thus from calculation. Calculation is the application of known and resolved principles to a knowable and resolvable situation. It is a dream of a kind of death of the subject, but not of the liberation of unmappable drives and impulses from the systematic thinking of a power/knowledge. Calculation is a dream of the erasure of contingency, and thus of history, of accident, of the possibility of open-ness to the Levinasian other or the Badiou-ean event, both of which require, in their own way, a protosubjective fidelity (to a wounding, revealing always-already in Levinas, a projective elaboration of productive innovation in Badiou) that welcomes the diachronic. In contrast to these mutually antagonistic logics of ethical self reappraisal, calculation is a dream of the reduction of desire to drive, of organisation to machine, of arrangement to system. It is the utopia of functionality, albeit one with an un-thought, all too clearly defined, if un-selfcritical, un-questionable goal. This un-questioning automatism is why by nature, calculation requires to be coordinated\*/and why it coordinates so well\*/with one of the many fundamentalisms available: divine apocalypse, enduring military hegemony, universal consumerism, consensual indignation, bourgeois success generally achieved, sentimental charity experienced as a kind of condescending luxury, a synchronous death. This explains the fit between the revived, putatively archaic logics of fundamentalism and the complexity and sophistication of the technology it harnesses for its deployment. The un-considering, un-deciding logistics of calculating competence shares with fundamentalism a dream of the erasure of discussion and free deliberation, a reduction to zero of contingent, inventive, critical thinking.

Debate needs differential relationships to the politics of war – making framework a voting issue implies that NONE of our process was productive – they have to win that the 1AC should’ve NEVER HAPPENED and our process should be exterminate from debate, means they preserve status quo acquiescence to dominant grand narrative telos of debate – the executive authority to relegate speech unimportant preserves the hegemonic regime that will eliminate difference through war as a means to the end of peace.

Butler ‘4 [2004, Judith Butler is a Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at U.C. Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg. xix-xxi]

Dissent and debate depend upon the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terrorist-sympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility not of the views that are held, but of the very persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with heinous appellation. To continue to voice one’s views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discount the truth of appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an uninhabitable identification. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens not only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psychological terrorizations as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. It is precisely because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that ones does not say what one thinks. Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also function as an instrument of censorship. To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds vies that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique -empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. Public Policy, including foreign policy, often seeks to restrain the public sphere from being open to certain forms of debate and the circulation of media coverage. One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the public sphere itself. Without disposing populations in such a way that war seems good and right and true, no war can claim popular consent, and no administration can maintain popularity. To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content—certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption—but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt, and known. The public sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think critically and publicly about the effects of war.

### K

Anti-blackness is not an ontological antagonism but is comprised from a knot of hegemonic signification that can be undone – openness towards new conceptions of meaning for whiteness and blackness creates possibility for interrupting the dominant narrative of politics – confining identity to ontological categories forecloses any opportunity for change.

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Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” 6 but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.

### 2AC Intersections of Slavery Turn

Racial analysis of slavery crowds out an intersectional analysis – wrecks our ability to have an effective tool for understanding the inter-locking relations of domination under chattal slavery – Slavery was not solely an anti-black institution – it was a race, class, and gender specific institution – the rhetorical absence of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ensure it reinforces anti-blackness and will continue it in worse and more insidious forms

Collins 13 (Patricia Hill, Prof of Sociology @ University of Maryland at College Park, *On Intellectual Activism*)

Even though I realize that many in the current administration would not share this assumption, let us assume that the institutions of American society discriminate, whether by design or by accident. While many of us are familiar with how race, gender, and class operate separately to structure inequality, I want to focus on how these three systems interlock in structuring the institutional dimension of oppression. To get at the interlocking nature of race, class, and gender, I want you to think about the antebellum plantation as a guiding metaphor for a variety of American social¶ institutions. Even though slavery is typically analyzed as a racist institution, and occasionally as a class institution, I suggest that slavery was a race-, class-, and gender-specific institution. Removing any one piece from our analysis diminishes our understanding of the true nature of relations of domination and subordination under slavery. Slavery was a profoundly patriarchal institution. It rested on the dual tenets of White male authority and White male property, a joining of the political and the economic within the institution of the family. Heterosexism was assumed, and all Whites were expected to marry. Control over affluent White women's sexuality remained key to slavery's survival because property was to be passed on to the legitimate heirs of the slave owner. Ensuring affluent White women's virginity and chastity was deeply intertwined with maintenance of property relations. Under slavery, we see varying levels of institutional protection given to affluent White women, working-class and poor White women, and enslaved African women. Poor White women enjoyed few of the protections held out to their upper-class sisters. Moreover, the devalued status of Black women was key in keeping all White women in their assigned places. Controlling Black women's fertility was also vital to the continuation of slavery, for children born to slave mothers themselves were slaves. African American women shared the devalued status of chattel with their husbands, fathers, and sons. Racism stripped Blacks, as a group, of legal rights, education, and control over their own persons. African American women could be whipped, branded, sold, or killed, not because they were poor, or because they were women, but because they were Black. Racism ensured that Blacks would continue to serve Whites and suffer economic exploitation at the hands of all Whites. So we have a very interesting chain of command on the plantation-the affluent White master as the reigning patriarch; his¶ White wife helpmate to serve him, help him manage his property, and bring up his heirs; his faithful servants, whose production and reproduction were tied to the requirements of the capitalist political economy; and largely property-less, working-class White men and women watching from afar. In essence, the foundations for the contemporary roles of elite White women, poor Black women, working-class White men, and a series of other groups can be seen in stark relief in this fundamental American social institution. While Blacks experienced the harshest treatment under slavery, and thus made slavery clearly visible as a racist institution, race, class, and gender interlocked in structuring slavery's systemic organization of domination and subordination.

Alt fails – if necessary, the military could decimate entire cities and move others in smaller towns to camps to dissuade any would be revolutionaries from joining in the fight – numerous examples prove.

Welsh, ‘9 [March 30, 2009, Ian Welsh, work appeared at Huffington Post, Alternet, and Truthout, “Guerrilla Warfare: The Way of the Weak”, http://www.ianwelsh.net/guerrilla-warfare/]

#### Let’s talk about **the easy way** first. **Scare and weaken the population into no longer supporting the insurgency. The primary method here is mass killing, and removal of the population to camps. If a city** (like Fallujah) **is a problem, you destroy it entirely, and you kill everyone in it, or at least every fighting-age male. This is one reason why US marines would not allow men out of Fallujah in the run up to the final assault. Do this often enough, and people get the message that supporting the insurgency is a really bad idea**. And **if you’re willing to kill hundreds of thousands or millions of civilians, you’re bound to get a lot of the right people, along with a lot of the wrong people. Immoral? Of course, but it does work. Take other towns and cities which are troublesome but not quite so bad, and move their populations to camps. This allows you to control the population in such a way that they can’t support guerrillas**.3 **Both of these methods were used by the US in the Philippines on a large scale. They worked. Wiping out a huge chunk of the population also worked for Russia against Chechnya**, notable for inspiring enough hatred to spawn female suicide bombers, who were mostly avenging male relatives or lovers tortured to death by the Russians; **and for Turkey against their own Kurds**, a campaign notable for wiping out entire villages, killing the men and raping the women. **The camp strategy is currently being used by India against some of its indigenous guerrilla movements. A sufficiently ruthless commander could win the Iraq occupation in a few years, if given the green-light to commit massive atrocities and kill a few million Iraqis.**

### Wise Whiteness

The critique is wrong about whiteness – by acknowledging the difference between the racial category of “whiteness” and the racial behavior of “whiteliness”, the aff can effectively change social positions – privilege is inevitable, the only question is how to articulate that privilege to undermine racism – if society is divided now, there’s only a risk that we do something good.

Sullivan, ‘6 [2006; Shannon Sullivan; Penn State, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University; Indiana University Press; “Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits Of Racial Privilege”]

#### So then, what are white people to do with respect to space if they wish to be ‘‘race traitors’’ but cannot and should not attempt to shed their whiteness?50 How might white people live their spatiality such that they challenge rather than support racism? The distinction between being white and being whitely can help address these questions.51 **‘‘Being white’’ refers to physical traits such as pale skin color, while ‘‘being whitely’’ refers to ‘‘a deeply ingrained way of being in the world’’ that includes behaviors, habits, and dispositions.**52 **The connection between being white and being whitely is contingent, rather than necessary**, which means that **people who are white need not also be whitely**. The fact that a person has physical features, such as pale skin, that tend to locate her as white does not necessarily mean that she has to think or behave as if white people are racially superior to non-white people. While biology contributes to a person’s cultural, social, and political habits, it does not determine them. **The relationship between being white and being whitely is transactional**, which means **that their relationship is never as simple as one of cultural whiteliness overlaying biological whiteness. Biological whiteness**— the fact that particular skin, hair, facial, and other physical features are identified as racially white—**is not prior to, but is a product of whiteliness itself**.53 But **the white-whitely distinction** still can be used in meaningful ways; it **can be invoked without resorting to a biologism of race. One can and should acknowledge that whiteness is not a ‘‘natural,’’ physical substratum that is overlaid by cultural forms of whiteliness. One can and should understand whiteness as transactional and acknowledge that spatiality helps constitute who counts as white**. One also can and should recognize that often **troubling political motivations for appealing to the existence of white and black races are informed by the racism of whiteliness**. One can and should do all of this at the same time that one retains the use of the category of whiteness. This is because **even though being categorized as white may be a product of whiteliness, being white is no less real for being such. Even though it is psychically, socially, and materially constituted rather than biologically determined, whiteness will continue to be a necessary and useful category for philosophical analyses as long as white racist societies continue to discriminate invidiously against people based on their physical characteristics.** There are additional reasons to be cautious when using a white-whitely distinction. To the extent that it implies that **whiteness is fairly difficult (if not impossible) to change but that whiteliness is relatively simple to transform, the distinction is problematic**. It is not the case that **deeply ingrained ways of being in the world—habits, in other words—are easy to modify merely because they are not physical features**. (And even this way of phrasing the concern is odd since many habits manifest themselves in one’s physical features.) **Especially when they are unconscious, habits of whiteliness can be extremely difficult to detect, let alone change. While acquired rather than innate, unconscious habits of white privilege can develop a relative fixity that makes them just as difficult to modify as one’s physical features, if not more so.** Carefully qualified in these ways, **the distinction between being white and whitely allows both the insistence that white people cannot and should not attempt to think of themselves as ceasing to be white and the realization that this insistence does not have to mean that acknowledging oneself as white dooms one to total complicity with racism. White people cannot willfully change the physical features that tend to result in their classification as white**—at least, not many of them and only to a limited degree—but **they can and should attempt to unlearn their whiteliness— even if** here too **those attempts must be partial and limited. White people** can and **need to find ways of transacting with the world as white that undermine white racism. Doing so means that white people must find ways to use their racial privilege against racism**. It also means **that when fighting racism, white people do not become marginal in white racist societies in the same ways that non-white people are. Unlearning whiteliness does not mean pretending to have no racial privileges or thinking of oneself as having renounced all racial privileges.** Instead, **renouncing one’s whiteliness often means acknowledging and using one’s privilege as a white person to combat racism. This** claim **may seem paradoxical since one feature of whiteliness is the exercise of white privilege. To use one’s privilege as a white person, even in the service of antiracist projects, may appear to only strengthen, rather than dismantle, that privilege**. And, **indeed, this is a danger that can never be completely eliminated. But if a person cannot step out of her skin and cease being white and if at least some privileges will continue to be awarded to white people in a racist society whether they want them or not, white people will continue to be privileged. Like it or not, a white person’s ‘‘unjust privilege and power will not [completely] ‘go away’, no matter how hard one works to become a traitor.’**’54 **The question** for white race traitors **is not will they continue to have some racial privileges, but what will they do with those privileges? The answer to that question and a key to being a white race traitor at this point in history is finding ways to use white racial privilege against itself. ‘‘Privilege, in the hands of a traitor, [can] becom[e] a tool for democracy,’’ rather than a tool for the increase of unjust privileges for white people**.55 **White people need to be accountable for how and to what ends they use the tools of their privilege.**

### Main

The neg’s dualistic thinking promotes an us-them binary of white and non-white as a heuristic for thinking about racial issues – the method of black liberation prefigures a pervasive white enemy – this promotes a culture of blame that seeks to externalize responsibility for imperialist capitalist white supremacist patriarchy, locking in rigid identity categories that trap us in a past where certain subject positions are always victimized and others are always victimizing – this calcifies domination and oppression – our alternative moves beyond simple moralistic blame-laying in favor of complex analysis of how oppression manifests itself in all of our mindsets – this politics of accountability is comparatively more effective in addressing domination than a politics of blame

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(bell, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice, pg. 43)

Clearly the future of diversity lies in creating greater awareness and greater critical consciousness about the importance of ending domination, of challenging and changing white supremacy. Riane Eisler urges in her partnership model that we shift from an us-versus-them attitude to a worldview where we place the “same standards of human rights and responsibilities provided by the partnership model to all cultures.” She contends: “In a world where technologies of communication and destruction span the globe almost instantaneously, creating a better world is a matter of enlightened self-interest.” Now more than ever we need to create learning communities that make learning the theory and practice of diversity essential aspects of curriculum. In my recent book Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom, I call attention to the way in which issues of diversity both inside and outside the classroom are slowly being pushed back into the realm of silence and misinformation. As I wrote: “More than ever before, students need to learn from unbiased perspectives, be they conservative or radical. More than ever before, students and teachers need to fully understand differences of nationality, race, sex, class, and sexuality if we are to create ways of knowing that reinforce education as the practice of freedom.” Learning to challenge and change binary thinking – the us-and-them paradigm – is one way to create a foundation that can be sustained. Holding onto binary thinking actually keeps dominator culture in place, for one aspect of that culture is the projection outward onto an enemy, an “other,” whenever things go wrong, and this casting of blame in turns helps to promote a culture of vicitimization. When we are more energized by the practice of blaming then we are by efforts to create transformation, we not only cannot find relief from suffering, we are creating the conditions that help keep us stuck in the status quo. Our attachment to blaming, to identifying the oppressor stems from the fear that if we cannot unequivocally and absolutely state who the enemy is then we cannot know how to organize resistance struggle. In the insightful book Ruling Your World: Ancient Strategies for Modern Life, Mipham Rinpoche talks about learning to understand others rather than blaming them. He shares: “I remember my father and other of the older generation of Tibetan lamas saying that they did not blame the Communist Chinese for the destruction of Tibet. They felt that blaming the Chinese would not solve anything. It would only trap Tibetans in the past.” Similarly, any critical examination of the history of the civil rights struggle in the United States will show that greater progress was made when leaders emphasized the importance of forgiving one’s enemies, working for reconciliation and the formation of a beloved community, rather than angry retaliation. Casting blame and calling for vengeance was an aspect of militant movements for black power that have really failed to sustain the climate of unlearning racism previously forged by nonviolent anti-racist struggle. In the aftermath of sixties rebellion, the more black folks were encouraged to vent rage, to “blame” all white folks for race-based exploitation and domination, and to eschew any notion of forgiveness, the more an internalized sense of victimhood became the norm

. Tragically, today many black folks are more despairing of any possibility that racism can be effectively challenged and changed than at other similar historical moments when white supremacist aggression was more overtly life threatening. Unenlightened white folks who proclaim either that racism has ended or that they are not responsible for slavery engage in a politics of blame wherin they disavow political reality to insist that black folk are never really victims of racism but are the agents of their own suffering. Dualistic thinking, which is at the core of dominator thinking, teaches people that there is always the oppressed and the oppressor, a victim and a victimizer. Hence there is always someone to blame. Moving past the ideology of blame to a politics of accountability is a difficult move to make in a society where almost all political organizing, whether conservative or radical, has been structured around the binary of good guys and bad guys. Accountability is a much more complex issue. A politics of blame allows a contemporary white person to make statements like, “My family never owned slaves,” or “Slavery is over. Why can’t they just get over it?” In contrast, a politics of accountability would emphasize that all white people benefit from the privileges accrued from racist exploitation past and present and therefore are accountable for changing and transforming white supremacy and racism. Accountability is a more expansive concept because it opens a field of possibility where in we are all compelled to move beyond blame to see where our responsibility lies. Seeing clearly that we live within a dominator culture of imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, I am compelled to locate where my responsibility lies. In some circumstances I am in a position to be a victimizer. If I only lay claim to those aspects of the system where I define myself as the oppressed and someone else as my oppressor then I continually fail to see the larger picture. Any effort I might make to challenge domination is likely to fail if I am not looking accurately at the circumstances that create suffering, and thus seeing the larger picture. After more than thirty years of talking to folks about domination, I can testify that masses of folks in our society – both black and white – resist seeing the larger picture.